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Much has been written on internationalisation, and particularly in recent years the 
strengthened international dimension of higher education has spurred scholars to analyse 
current developments (Teichler 1999). The main focus of the academic contributions is on 
describing internationalisation activities, ranging from issues like student and staff mobility 
(e.g. Teichler 1996, Maiworm & Teichler 1996), joint and international curricula and 
curriculum change (e.g. Van der Wende 1996), exporting and marketing higher education 
(e.g. Mazzarol & Soutar 2001), and national policies regarding internationalisation (e.g. 
Kälvemark & van der Wende 1996). Regarding the research approaches in the body of 
publications on internationalisation, Kehm (2003) distinguishes six basic approaches; 
particularly analyses, systematic overviews and critical assessments dominate. Despite the 
overwhelming attention to the issue of internationalisation, theory-based (or –inspired) 
analyses are rare. This chapter attempts to contribute to bridging the gap between research on 
internationalisation in higher education and the discipline of public administration and public 
policy.  
 
The focus will be on the impact of the European Commission’s Erasmus programme (1987 – 
now) on national policy-making in higher education in the fifteen member states (and 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) 1. We are both interested in the impact itself and the 
process – including its dynamics – along which the impact has developed. The two guiding 
research questions are: to what extent has Erasmus affected national higher education policies 
and how we can explain different impacts on national higher education systems? 
 
 
The conceptual model  
 
The Erasmus programme is a European-level policy initiative with accompanying 
instruments. Whereas the programme intended to have an impact on students and staff and on 
higher education institutions, we suggest that this policy has (had) also an impact (either 
direct or indirect) on national higher education systems and on national policy-making in 
those systems as well. At the same time we are aware that not only European-level policies 
such as the Erasmus programme affect national policies. Also nationally mediated types of 
change (i.e. changes dependent on priorities and directions set by national governments, such 
as massification, increased stakeholder involvement, marketisation, but also financial 
contingencies) and global warming types of changes (i.e. changes that take place because of 
developments in the environment on which national governments have no direct control, such 
as the transition to knowledge-based economy, and economic globalisation) have an impact 
on policies of higher education. Figure 1 explains the (possible) impacts of the Erasmus 
programme.     
 
 
                                                          
1 The empirical data of this contribution stem from a EC commissioned project on the evaluation of 
Erasmus (“Evaluation of Erasmus institutional and national impact”, DGEAC/24/02). The project was 
carried out by PricewaterhouseCoopers, the Netherlands, and the Center for Higher Education Policy 
Studies, University of Twente (see Van Brakel et al. 2004).  
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 Figure 1:  Policy development at the national level (Van Brakel et al., 2004, p. 25)  
 
The way we view the impact of the Erasmus programme coincides with one of the five uses 
of the concept of “Europeanisation” distinguished by Olsen (2002, p. 923-924). 
Europeanisation as the “central penetration of national systems of governance” closely fits 
our concern. It deals with the changes “in core domestic institutions of governance and 
politics, understood as a consequence of the development of European-level institutions, 
identities and policies” (Olsen 2002, p. 932). With this observation, we more or less 
immediately enter two – interrelated – debates: first, to what extent change takes place and 





Regarding the question to what extent change takes place, quite some literature emerged, 
although much of the work is of recent date and some maintain that “actual consequences of 
Euro-level action have not been a matter of empirical investigation” (Kassim & Menon 1996, 
p. 1). Particularly political scientists and public administration researchers focused on the 
impact of European developments on national policy-making following a period with 
considerable attention to (the emergence of) institutions at the supra-national level. Authors 
distinguish the extent of change often on a scale, ranging from low levels of adjustment (from 
the perspective of the imposition of supranational policies) to high levels of adjustment. 
Radaelli (2000), for instance, discerns inertia, absorption, transformation, and retrenchment as 
different types of adjustment (see also Héritier et al 2001).  
In a recent overview, Olsen (2002, p. 935-937) maintains that there is considerable 
empirical evidence to assume that national patterns are resistant to but also flexible enough to 
cope with changes at the European level. National governments have differentially adapted to 
European pressures. Adaptation reflects institutional resources and traditions, the pre-existing 
balance of domestic institutional structures and the values defining the appropriate national 
political forms. European-level developments do not dictate specific forms of adaptation but 
leave considerable discretion to domestic actors and institutions. In addition, European-level 
changes are just one among several drivers of domestic change (Olsen 2002, p. 935-936). 
Olsen concludes that domestic institutional structures, and the values, norms, interest and 
power distributions in which they are embedded, are monuments of historical battles, joint 
problem-solving and peaceful conflict resolution. Institutions should not be expected to 
change easily and quickly except under extraordinary conditions (Olsen 2002, p. 944; see also 
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e.g. Menon & Hayward 1996, Hanf & Soetendorp 1998a, Mény et al 1996,  see Peterson 1996 
on European research and development policy)2. 
 
Regarding the how (mechanisms, processes) and why (explanatory factors) of domestic 
change, analysts seem to disagree more. Börzel & Risse (2000) distinguish two theoretical 
approaches that more or less indicate opposing views on domestic change. In their view, 
rational institutionalism – following the logic of consequentialism (March and Olsen 1989) – 
assumes that in case of a misfit between European and domestic policies and institutions, 
societal and political actors are provided with opportunities leading to a domestic 
redistribution of power. This redistribution is dependent on the capacities of actors to seize 
opportunities and to avoid constraints. Such capacities are affected by the existence of 
multiple veto points in the domestic institutional structure and the existence of formal 
institutions. In contrast, sociological institutionalism posits – following the logic of 
appropriateness – that misfits between European and domestic norms and collective 
understandings exert pressure on domestic institutions. Whether the misfit leads to adjustment 
of the domestic institutions is dependent on norm entrepreneurs (that mobilise, persuade and 
redefine interests) and political culture (conducive to consensus-building and cost-sharing).  
 Yet, the two views are not mutually exclusive. As the founding fathers of the two logics 
(March & Olsen 1998, p. 12) maintain “… political action is generally explicable neither as 
based exclusively on a logic of consequences nor as based exclusively on a logic of 
appropriateness”.  There may be different relations between the two logics. The authors 
distinguish four approaches, based on: the combination of a clear and unclear logic; a major 
logic setting the constraints with a minor logic refining it; a developmental approach of 
alternating logics; and an approach viewing one logic being a special case of the other logic. 
 
Not surprisingly, given the opposing views on the explanation of domestic change and the 
debates on whether these views might be compatible, those studying the impact of 
Europeanisation have developed different perspectives on the mechanisms and process of 
changes. Knill & Lehmkuhl (1999) – studying the cases of environmental policy, road 
haulage and European railway policies – distinguish three mechanisms: the prescription of an 
institutional model to which domestic arrangements have to be adjusted; altering domestic 
opportunity structures (and thus the distribution of power and resources of domestic actors); 
and altering the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors. In a similar vein, Schmidt (2002) 
distinguishes between coercion at a high level (where member states have to follow a highly 
specified set of rules); coercion at a less high level (where the rules are less highly specified, 
leaving leeway for the domestic actors); mimesis (where the supranational actor only suggests 
rules); and regulatory competition (where rules are not specified). To explain different 
domestic responses to similar European challenges, Schmidt (2002) – analysing EU policies 
characterised by different levels of adjustment pressures – points at the role of economic 
vulnerability (the presence or absence of economic crisis; competitiveness in capital and 
product markets), political institutional capacity (policy actors’ ability to impose or negotiate 
change, depending upon political interactions and institutional arrangements), policy legacies 
(‘fit’ with long-standing policies and policy-making institutions), policy preferences (‘fit’ 
with the old preferences and/or openness to new) and discourse (ability to change preferences 
by altering perceptions of economic vulnerabilities and policy legacies and thereby enhance 
political institutional capacity to impose or negotiate change). Menon & Hayward (1996), 
reflecting on the impact of European industrial policies and trying to explain the varying 
impacts at national levels, refer to ambiguities in the supra-national regulations, the absence 
of supportive European resources, the power of the nation-states and the preferences of those 
involved in national policy-making. At the same time they point at other factors of influence – 
                                                          
2 We have to bear in mind that many of the analyses discussed here have focused on areas where 
Europe “hits home”, i.e. where some impact could be expected (on the basis of e.g. explicit European 
legislation or requirements). In the section on “the nature and objectives of European policy” we will 
deal with the specific nature of the EU’s authority in higher education matters.   
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beyond European policies – that impact national policies (e.g. globalisation, technological 
developments, and finance, see e.g. Ohmae 1990).  
 
 
Reframing the impacts of European policies 
 
An interesting question is to what extent the literature on the domestic impact of Europe is (or 
should be!) fundamentally differing from ‘traditional’ policy analysis. In other words, do we 
need a specific theory of domestic change, taking into account the peculiarities of 
Europeanisation or would it be as (or more) profitable to rely on the abundant existing 
literature on policy development and implementation? At first sight, the mechanisms and 
explanations formulated above resemble the factors of influence discerned in the policy 
sciences literature. What follows below is not so much a plea to go back to the roots of policy 
analysis, but to reframe the factors of influence mentioned by the authors in the previous 
section.   
 In general, the literature on policy development and policy implementation distinguishes 
the following factors that impact the effects of policies: the nature of the (objectives and 
instruments) of the policy to be implemented; the capacities of the actors assumed to carry out 
the policy as well as the dispersion of power across the actors involved; the objectives 
(including the norms and values) of those actors; and the institutional structure of the field in 
which the policy should be implemented (see e.g. Hill 1993, Howlett & Ramesh 1995, 
Sabatier 1999). Of course, analysts differ in their views regarding the importance of different 
factors. Some stress the role of institutional rules (e.g. Ostrom et al 1994) or emphasise the 
formation of coalitions of actors in the policy process (Sabatier 1999, Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith 1993), others stress the preferences and cognitions of actors involved in the policy 
process (Scharpf 1997).  
  
If we reorganise the factors of relevance, mentioned by researchers on Europeanisation and 
put them under the headings of the ‘traditional’ policy analysis literature, the following 
overview can be presented. 
 
Table 1: Factors impacting policy effects/domestic change 
 
Policy analysis literature Research on Europeanisation 
The nature of objectives and 
instruments of the policy 
The extent of adjustment pressure (Schmidt 2002), ambiguity of 
Europeanisation (Sverdrup 2000), the cognitive impact of Europeanisation 
(Radaelli 1997), nature of European requirements (Knill & Lehmkuhl 
1999), joint decision trap: separation of decision-making and policy 
implementation (Scharpf 1988) 
Institutional structure  Policy legacies; economic vulnerability (Schmidt 2002), path-dependency 
of European-level developments (Sverdrup, 2000), multiple veto points and 
formal institutions (Börzel & Risse 2000), histories, traditions, cultures, 
constitutional arrangements and administrative systems (Menon & Hayward 
1996), stage of integration into EU (Hanf & Soetendorp 1998) 
Objectives (including norms and 
values) of actors 
 
Policy preferences and discourse (Schmidt 2002), institutional misfit 
between European and domestic policies and processes (Börzel & Risse 
2000), political culture and other informal institutions (Börzel & Risse 
2000; Mouritzen et al 1996) 
Capacities and powers of actors political institutional capacity (Schmidt 2002), norm entrepreneurs (Börzel 
& Risse 2000), interest intermediation (Kassim & Menon 1996) 
  
Admitted, some of the factors mentioned by analysts of Europeanisation might fit other 
factors of relevance from the ‘traditional’ policy analysis literature (as well). The point is that 
the – however short – journey into the Europeanisation literature shows that many factors fit 
the factors derived from the general policy analysis literature. At the same time, most of the 
European analyses do not cover all potentially relevant factors from that literature. An 
explanation would be that the analysts have focused on a specific area of interest, in which 
certain factors are obviously more important, but thereby neglecting other theoretically 
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important factors. This explanation does not disqualify the analyses, but simply indicates that 
the generalisability of their findings (in addition to the problem of different conceptualisations 
of important factors) is low. Therefore we will use the factors from the policy analysis 
literature and apply these in the context of our research question. 
 
 
The nature of objectives and instruments of the European policy 
 
Before describing the actual objectives and instruments of Erasmus, we pay attention to the 
context of the EU’s authority in education. Education – in contrast to many other policy areas 
– is by and large outside the formal realm of supranational authority. Through the history of 
European integration, national governments have been very hesitant to transfer national 
responsibilities in education (but also culture) to the European level (see e.g. Brouwer, 1996; 
Neave 2003). Education was considered a principal responsibility of the nation state. 
Consequently the competencies are very limited and based on the subsidiarity principle (the 
Commission’s power to take initiatives is limited to those instances where member states 
cannot achieve an objective of their own; a compromise between proponents and opponents 
of an active communitarian education policy), positioning the EU in a supplementary and 
supportive role, fully respecting the responsibilities of national governments regarding the 
contents of education, the structure of the educational systems, and the nations’ linguistic and 
cultural diversity3. This does neither imply that the nation states were against co-operation, 
nor does it imply that there are no competencies at all at the European level. The EU has, for 
instance, an important role in the recognition of professional qualifications. Also, through 
time, it has become clear that it is hardly possible to clearly distinguish between areas where 
the EU has competencies and those where the EU has no competencies, particularly given the 
presumed importance of the role of education in the European economy (mobility of labour). 
The Maastricht Treaty (1992) more or less codified the existing practice of supranational 
(financial) support for co-operation (Verbruggen 2002) and formalised the extension of EU 
activity from vocational training into higher education. The New European Treaty 
(Convention) that was agreed upon in 2004 left the legal framework for Community action in 
the field of education unchanged. However, the European Commission’s role in promoting 
coordination (e.g. by introducing guidelines, indicators, promoting best practices, etc.) is 
growing through the so-called “open method of coordination”, especially in the context of the 
Lisbon process (Huisman & Van der Wende 2004). The limited competences of the EU in the 
area of education policy obviously restricts the choice of policy instruments. The support of 
student mobility and institutional cooperation were in first instance the only legitimate 
instruments, which constitute the basic elements of the Erasmus programme.   
 
The first version of the Erasmus programme was decided upon by the European Council in 
1986. It would run for four years, but in 1989 the programme was extended for five years. 
The main objective of Erasmus was the increase of the number of higher education students 
spending an integrated period of study in another member state, meant as a step towards the 
creation of manpower with experience of economic and social conditions in other member 
states (De Wit & Verhoeven 2001, p. 189). A target of 10% of the EC students was 
mentioned. The instruments at hand were:  
• Student grants (the European budget to be distributed proportionally across the 
member states; national agencies being in charge of the administration of the 
programme) covering mobility costs for those students being mobile in the 
framework of networks of departments of the Inter-university Cooperation 
Programmes (ICPs). The departments were required to recognise the mobile students’ 
achievements abroad and had to accept that student do not pay fees to the foreign host 
                                                          
3 In Scharpf’s (2001) terminology, the multi-level interactions between the European level and the 
national governments most aptly are captured by ‘mutual adjustment’ and ‘intergovernmental 
negotiations’ (instead of ‘hierarchical direction’ and/or ‘joint decision’).  
 6
institution (Teichler 1996, p. 154). The participating higher education institutions 
would also receive moderate budgets for institutional support of mobility. 
• Financial support for projects enhancing mobility, such as projects on academic 
recognition of diplomas and periods of study, projects on developing information 
networks (e.g. the Network of Academic Recognition Information Centres, NARICs), 
projects relating to the development of a European Community Course Credits 
Transfer System (ECTS), projects relating to the development of joint curricula, and 
small research projects. 
 
In 1995 the instruments and procedures changed somewhat, when the Erasmus programme 
was integrated in the 1995-1999 Socrates programme (an EU umbrella programme for 
general and higher education). The aim of Socrates was to contribute to the development of 
quality education and training and the creation of an open European area for co-operation in 
education. An important development shortly before the launch of the new programme was 
the fact that education has been taken up in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (see above). 
Education was considered important in the development towards the economic and monetary 
union, and therefore taken up as one of the competencies of the European Commission. 
However the principle of subsidiarity was maintained: what the member states could achieve 
themselves independently, should be arranged by the member states. The overall objective of 
Erasmus did not change that much, although the objective of creating a European dimension 
in higher education was more explicitly formulated. The instruments also changed somewhat: 
a greater stress on benefits for a larger group of students (including non-mobile students), 
notably through curricular innovation and teaching staff mobility as well as improving 
administrative support for mobile students. As a consequence a larger share of the resources 
were reserved for Curricular Development and Intensive Programmes, and the promotion of 
ECTS. Also the concept of Thematic Networks (stimulating innovative concepts of 
educational change in networks of experts and key actors, focusing on individual fields of 
study or special issues) was introduced. 
 
Also managerial aspects changed (Lanzendorf & Teichler 2002):  
• Each higher education institution has to submit an application containing all exchange 
and co-operation activities. The application would form the basis for an Institutional 
Contract (IC) with the European Commission. Part of the IC would be a European 
Policy Statement (EPS) detailing the institution’s European policy and the role of 
Socrates herein.  
• Participating higher education institutions were supposed to keep and provide on 
request written traces of established co-operation activities between them and other 
higher education institutions (by bilateral co-operation agreements). 
 
The managerial change of replacing ICPs by ICs (containing EPSs) seems trifling, but it is 
important to note that implicitly the new procedures put greater emphasis on the coherence of 
institutional goals, the role of the central level of the institutions, and strategic thinking in 
terms of setting clear targets (Kehm 1998, p. 9-10). However, the shift to institutional-
decision making and targeted strategies turned out to succeed best in institutions that wanted 
to move into that direction anyway, which was the case only for a small minority. The step 
towards cooperation at the institutional level also proved to be a difficult one. 
Institutionalisation of new curricula and especially new type of degrees was hindered by great 
barriers related to national system characteristics. Consequently, Socrates did not have the 
snowball effect which would lead to a new stage of cooperation in higher education in 
Europe. However, it did enhance the awareness of national system barriers to further 
European cooperation (Barblan et al. 2000; Huisman & Van der Wende 2004).  
 
The current Erasmus programme (again part of Socrates, 2000-2006) maintains the same 
objectives and instruments as the previous programme. The same activities are listed: student 
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mobility grants (action 2), support to organise student mobility, teaching staff mobility, 
intensive programmes, preparatory visits, ECTS, joint curriculum development, and thematic 
networks (action 1). From 2003-2004 on, for technical and efficiency reasons, the ICs are to 






Regarding the possible inhibiting or stimulating elements of institutional structures, our 
attention goes particularly to the structure (and underlying norms and values as well as the 
history) of the higher education systems. One of the concomitants of the Erasmus programme 
(or better: internationalisation activities in general) is that national systems of higher 
education – formerly mostly under the control of national governments – are becoming more 
open to the international scene. Of course, higher education systems have been permeated 
internationally for ages, but the scope has increased considerably. This openness makes 
higher education systems potentially vulnerable to external scrutiny, both of a positive and 
negative nature. Particularly negative scrutiny (e.g. mismatch between study structures, lack 
of quality or quality control, lack of credit-point systems and recognition, imbalance of in- 
and outflow of students and teachers) may challenge national governments to change their 
national strategies and policies (see also Rakic 2001 on calculative and non-calculative 
imitation). Or as Neave (2003, p. 151) formulates it: “Institutional characteristics that once 
expressed national identity, genius, and preservation were now recast as obstacles to student 
mobility …. differences in such matters as student fees, residentiality, variations in curricular 
content, and methods of student evaluation …. were now viewed less as monuments to 
diversity than as examples of opacity, absence of transparency, and general agents of 
hindrance and obscurantism”. It is of importance to highlight those institutional 
characteristics that debase national governments in the sense that they can be held responsible 
for the stimulation or blocking of mobility. The country’s climate may impact the 
attractiveness to foreign students, but not much that can be done about it. Considering the 
features possibly of influence (e.g. based on students’ motivations for studying abroad and 
main problems encountered while staying abroad, see e.g. Maiworm and Teichler 2002), we 
estimate that governments are most concerned about the (perceived) quality of the higher 
education system. Quality should be understood in a broad sense in this context; it includes 
the academic level of education, the smooth organisation of credit transfer, good academic 
and non-academic guidance, language courses, access to infrastructure, etc.  
In addition, it is important to look beyond the institutional structure of higher education and to 
take into account general national institutional facts, such as the regulatory conditions (e.g. 
visa or administrative matters in general) and mobility-related issues not directly related to 
higher education as such: e.g. finding accommodation and the cost of living in the host 
country. A final institutional fact we think is of influence, is the country’s position in the EU. 
We think that the national government’s perspective on EC programmes and policies will be 
coloured, dependent on whether the country is a long-standing member of the EU, a new 
member state or an accessing country.  
 
 
Objectives of actors 
 
The Europeanisation and public policy literature suggests that a clear mismatch between 
European objectives and domestic policy objectives, decreases the chances for easy 
acceptance and implementation. This set of factors relating to mismatches between objectives 
coincides to some extent with the factors relating to the nature of European objectives and 
instruments as such, but under this heading the focus is on the distance between European and 
domestic objectives or possible side-effects of European policies that run counter to domestic 
objectives. We expect that in general national governments will endorse the 
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internationalisation activities, for – as has been mentioned above – they are part and parcel of 
higher education (and research) and in line with academic values and ideas regarding the 
quality of education and research. Therefore, when a country has a predominantly academic 
rationale for internationalisation (considering it mainly as a means to improve the quality of 
education and research), European objectives (such as those of the Erasmus programme) and 
national objectives can match very well. However, when countries have a more economic 
rationale for internationalisation (seeing it mainly as a source of institutional income and/or as 
a way to enhance economic competitiveness), European objectives focusing on cooperation 
may be seen as less supportive to the countries’ objectives. In Europe, a trend towards more 
economic rationales for internationalisation is observed (Van der Wende 2001; Huisman & 
Van der Wende 2004).  
Furthermore, there are some limits to unconcerned support for mobility. Mobility may be a 
catalyst for brain-drain (temporary mobility leading to long-term mobility, leading to 
domestic shortages in manpower). Another element worth considering is the objective of 
national governments to preserve the domestic culture including the language. 
Internationalisation can of course be seen as a means to promote the national language, but 
particularly for countries with “small languages”, increasing mobility may put a pressure on 
the higher education system to use a much-spoken language as the language of instruction. A 
final barrier to be mentioned – particular in the context of Erasmus is the fact that national 
governments – in terms of student and staff mobility and international cooperation – may 
want to focus on other geographical areas than Europe; the US and former colonies being the 
most obvious examples. The latter barrier should not be seen as the most important barrier, 
for a focus on Europe in the Erasmus programme does not block mobility to other continents 
completely. In the worst case (from the domestic perspective) the mobility flows may change 
towards mobility within Europe. In the best case, mobility increases: the Erasmus programme 
attracts students that otherwise would not have thought about spending a study period in 
another country.  
 
 
Capacities and powers of actors 
 
Regarding the capacities of actors we are almost immediately inclined to translate this into 
financial capacities. Indeed, when national governments lack the financial means to support 
internationalisation activities (in particular student and staff mobility), this will be a barrier. In 
the case of the Erasmus programme, however, the financial support is granted by the 
European Commission and national governments are free to offer additional support (either 
by supplementing grants or by establishing mobility grant systems). With respect to the 
powers of actors, there may be important actors that are able to block policy initiatives if such 
policies are detrimental to the objectives of those actors. Of particular relevance is the 
possible resistance of the academic oligarchy against intended change brought about by 
governmental policies. In the case of internationalisation in general and student and staff 
mobility in particular, we estimate that the resistance will be marginal given the fact that these 
aspects of internationalisation are part and parcel of higher education.  
 
 
Expectations on the impact of Erasmus 
 
Analysing the nature of the objectives and the instruments, we come to the following 
expectations. The objectives regarding mobility and co-operation are considered not to be at 
odds with domestic objectives: knowledge production and exchange are almost by definition 
an international activity, although the importance may differ from discipline to discipline and 
profession to profession. Objectives related to improving mobility and co-operation are 
therefore not seen as detriment to national objectives. The instruments are directed at 
(departments of) higher education institutions; they engage into a contract with the European 
Commission, which involves grants for student mobility and subsidies for activities relating to 
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improving the mobility in exchange for compliance with administrative efforts, e.g. annual 
reporting. In conceptual terms the instruments offer the participant – on a voluntary basis – 
extensions to their ‘regular’ activities, they do not restrict higher education institutions, nor 
force them to comply with the opportunities. The quantitative impact of the relatively soft 
instruments is considered relatively limited, for the total budget per higher education 
institution is only a fragment of the total budget of the institution and only a minority of 
students is involved in the programme (although it is fair to state that through time 
participation – both in terms of students and higher education institutions involved – and 
accompanying budgets increased). Furthermore, the Erasmus programme was not the only 
mobility programme around. In a number of countries, existing programmes already took care 
of mobility and exchange, also involving other than EU countries. In addition, in many 
countries ‘spontaneous’ mobility takes place at a considerable scale (Gordon and Jallade 
1996). In some countries, only a minority of mobile students are supported through Erasmus. 
It is important to note that the objectives and instruments of Erasmus do not pertain directly to 
the national governments, apart from the fact that the Erasmus programme requires a national 
agency to administer the national execution and the fact that national representatives took seat 
in the EU Socrates Committee.  
 
As such we hypothesise that the Erasmus programme – given the nature of the policy 
objectives and the specific instruments – hardly impact the national policies (this is not a 
disqualification, for it was not the intention of the programme to influence national policies!). 
Teichler (1996, p. 176) concludes that “Erasmus was extremely successful in contributing to a 
breakthrough in the public awareness of the value and relevance of temporary study in 
another country”. Field (1998, p. 115) is more critical. He maintains that the EU’s influence 
should not be exaggerated, pointing at low percentage of students involved (4% instead of the 
10% aimed at4), the differences between the member states regarding import and export of 
students, and at the considerable role of non-EU mobility. 
The expectation is supported by previous findings of studies on the impact of Erasmus. Van 
der Wende (2001, p. 435) concludes on the basis of a survey among persons involved in 
internationalisation policy-making: “It seemed that respondents had difficulties in indicating 
any concrete or direct impacts beyond the specific area of internationalisation. … it seems 
justified to state that the SOCRATES programme so far has not led to direct system level 
changes or other types of new orientations in the national higher education policies. Its clear 
impact seems to be limited to the level of institutions, curricula and the experience of 
individual students and academics”. One could argue that Erasmus increased the awareness of 
national governments regarding the (growing) importance of internationalisation. However, 
here it should be noted that the increasing importance was also already visible in the 
increasing interaction on higher education policy between national governments in the context 
of the OECD, e.g. the establishment of the Centre for Educational Research and Innovation in 
the 1970s (CERI) and the national education policy reviews; and UNESCO, e.g. the 
establishment of the International Institute for Education Planning in 1963 (see Van der 
Wende 2002).   
 
The theoretical argument and the higher education literature suggest a very modest impact of 
the Erasmus programme. There may however be differences across countries, particularly 
relating to mismatches between: 
- objectives of national governments and general internationalisation objectives of 
Erasmus (relating to the problem of brain-drain and preservation of the national 
culture and language). 
- institutional structure (e.g. perception of the quality of the higher education system) 
- capacities of actors involved (e.g. financial barriers). 
                                                          
4 Although it has always been unclear, whether the “10%” refers to the total amount of students 
enrolled, to first-year students or to the number of graduates of higher education  (Van der Wende 
2002).  
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In addition, it can be argued that there are long-term indirect impacts of the Erasmus 
programme, specifically relating to the institutional structure. As has been stressed above, 
increasing mobility and consequentially increasing openness of domestic higher education 
systems, and thus may raise questions of comparability of degrees and quality. Such questions 
may prompt national governments to develop suitable policies addressing issues concerning 
degree recognition, credit transfer and the like. We expect however that these long-term 
indirect impacts will be modest, the most important reason being that internationalisation in 
many European countries is – despite the increasing mobility – still not a core element of the 
higher education system and policy-making. In other words, issues like degree recognition 
and credit transfer have been important and are through time becoming more important but 
still the issues pertain to a small percentage of the student body.    
In sum: we expect a modest impact of Erasmus on national policy-making, and if there are 
impacts these will mainly be indirect and on the long-term. If there are differences across 






To test our expectations, we designed the following methodology. We analysed for the fifteen 
EC countries and for Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland the policy developments regarding 
internationalisation since the mid-1980s and carried out individual and group interviews with 
those involved in policy-making in general and internationalisation policies specifically. The 
group of interviewees particularly consisted of civil servants of the relevant ministries, 
sometimes representatives of national organisations involved in carrying out elements of the 
internationalisation policies were interviewed as well. The desk research analysis of policy 
developments was used as the input for the interview, as well as a set of three statements 
regarding the possible impact of Erasmus on domestic policy-making (see Van Brakel et al. 





The analysis of internationalisation policies (and the role of Erasmus) in the respective 
countries revealed the following. In most of the countries internationalisation policies 
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. Encompassing internationalisation policies are however of a 
more recent date (see also Kälvemark & Van der Wende 1996; Huisman & Van der Wende 
2004). The Bologna process has reinforced the linkages between internationalisation and 
general higher education policies. The Erasmus programme, particularly in its first years of 
existence, has contributed to the integration of internationalisation into general higher 
education policies. The analysis make at the same time clear that Erasmus predominantly had 
an impact on the higher education institutions themselves (see also Barblan et al. 1998). Also, 
the growing internationalisation activities of both students and higher education institutions 
increased the awareness of national governments of the importance of internationalisation. It 
stimulated the governments to take action in areas closely linked to mobility, such as 
additional mobility programmes or additional grants for Erasmus students. In some countries, 
however, Erasmus did not have this impact for the fact that internationalisation policies were 
already high on the policy agenda of either the government or the higher education 
institutions. In addition it should be mentioned that a large amount of mobility takes place 
outside the Erasmus programme; policy effects should in this case be attributed to mobility in 
general and not Erasmus solely. In this context it is also relevant to mention that specific 
national contexts were to a considerable extent determining the pace and direction of 
                                                          
5 Given time and space, we refrain from detailing the results per country (see Van Brakel et al. 2004, 
pp. 86-127). 
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internationalisation policies as well. The document analyses and interviews revealed that for 
instance growing international competitiveness, globalisation, marketisation and the increase 
role of the knowledge society (developments we captured under the heading of global 
warming type changes) have been important as well, impacting domestic policies regarding 
internationalisation. 
 
Further evidence of Erasmus’ limited impact is that interviewees confirmed the growing 
awareness of the importance of internationalisation in higher education policy, but 
interviewees were not able to explain clear-cut connections between the Erasmus programme 
and specific domestic policy initiatives (beyond complementary domestic mobility 
programmes and additional grants for Erasmus students). In more recent years, governments 
paid attention to policy issues other than those closely linked to mobility: the comparability of 
degrees, the convergence towards an undergraduate/graduate structure, quality assurance 
mechanisms, etc. Whereas there are certainly links between the Erasmus programme and 
these domestic policies, the Bologna process was considered to be of much more importance 
than Erasmus. A number of interviewees however stated that the Bologna process would have 
been different (particularly would have developed much slower) if Erasmus would not have 
been launched. Figure 2 graphically depicts the essence of the dynamics regarding the impact 
of Erasmus on national policy making: Erasmus particularly had a direct impact in terms of 
raising the awareness of national governments. Further direct impacts, more important than 
the impact on governments, were on the higher education institutions themselves and on the 
students. Indirectly, the increase of internationalisation activities put certain issues (credit 
transfer, quality assurance, portability of student loans) on the higher education agenda of 
national governments. At the same time certain developments in the supranational context of 
higher education (Bologna process, globalisation, marketisation) put pressure on national 
governments to pay attention to issues closely related to internationalisation. Through the 
document analysis and the interviews it became clear that the developments in the 
supranational contexts should be deemed more important as triggers for policy change than 
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Figure 2: Impacts of Erasmus and other policies/factors on national governments’ policies 
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Regarding the different impacts of Erasmus across the countries, it became clear that specific 
national characteristics (relating to the objectives of governments, the institutional structure, 
capacities of actors) played a role. Amongst the most important factors were:  
(1) The size of the community (within and outside Europe) speaking the country’s 
language (Greece and Sweden versus the UK and Spain). 
(2) The (colonial) history of the country (Portugal and the UK versus Austria and 
Norway). 
(3) The importance of internationalisation vis-à-vis other domestic issues (access issues 
in Ireland, long study duration in Germany and Italy, underemployment in Spain in 
the 1980s, lack of balance between incoming and outgoing students in the UK and 
Greece). 
(4) The role and power of certain stakeholders vis-à-vis the government (the relative 
independence of higher education institutions in the UK and Sweden, the strength of 
the academic community and employee organizations in Greece). 
(5) The length of the membership of the EU (Netherlands and Germany versus Sweden, 
Liechtenstein and Austria). 
Most of these factors (1, 2 and 5) particularly belong to the category of institutional structure 
(table 1). The third and fourth factor can be categorized under the heading of the objectives of 





Our theoretical expectation on the very modest direct impact of Erasmus was confirmed by 
the empirical data collected for the fifteen countries. The nature of the programme and its 
specific instruments neither intended to nor actually did encroach national responsibilities for 
higher education. However, also in line with the expectations, there were important indirect 
effects that both affected the general pattern across Europe as well as some of the differences 
between the countries.  
Since Erasmus had a considerable impact on the higher education institutions, certain issues 
(credit transfer, differences between national structures, degree recognition) became more 
important elements on the higher education policy agendas of responsible national ministries. 
Even more important, these elements appeared on the supranational agenda in the context of 
the Bologna and (later) Lisbon process. The data show that, across Europe, national 
governments acted upon the elements on the policy agenda. In theoretical terms, the factors of 
influence on the indirect impact of Erasmus were mainly in the domain of the institutional 
structure (policy legacies, see Schmidt 2002) and the domain of the nature of objectives 
(adjustment pressure, Schmidt 2002). Differences between countries are mainly due to 
elements of the institutional structure (language, [colonial] history, and length of 
membership) and to some extent elements of the objectives of actors and/or their power 
positions. This leads us to the conclusion that particularly elements of the institutional 
structure determined the impact of Erasmus.  
We realise that one of the “shortcomings” of the research (as is the case with much research 
focusing on institutional structure) has been the lack of clearness on which factors belong to 
which category of factors. The findings of this research allow us however – and this will be 
the next step – to go back to the policy literature for further clarification. 
 
A lesson learned from this exercise is, but we would certainly appreciate a broader discussion 
on this matter, that research on the impact of Europe not necessarily requires a specific 
“European” framework. It seems that we can work with the “traditional” disciplinary (be it 
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